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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the theme of animals in Adorno’s philosophy through an examination of his
critique of Kant.
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INTRODUCTION

Writing in the mid-twentieth century, philosopher and Frankfurt School critical theorist
Theodor W. Adorno was an early critic of humanity’s destructive relationship to the natural
world and its inhabitants. Much has been written in the secondary literature about Adorno’s
attempts to theorize and problematize the domination of “nature” (broadly conceived). His
critique of the domination of animals, however, has often been neglected. In this thesis I argue
that Adorno’s sensitivity to animal suffering informs his thought to a greater extent than
commentators have previously recognized. Although at first glance it may seem that animals
occupy only a marginal position in Adorno’s work, upon closer inspection one discovers that
references to animals occur throughout his corpus in relation to a wide variety of his concerns.
As I intend to show, animals are essential for understanding Adorno’s views on history,
aesthetics, ethics, and more.
In addition to criticizing the exploitation of animals in society, Adorno challenges the
way that animals have traditionally been conceived in Western philosophy. Accordingly, my
examination of the animal theme in Adorno centers around his critique of Immanuel Kant, for it
is primarily through his critique of Kant’s moral attitude concerning animals that Adorno’s own
animal philosophy emerges.
Chapter One establishes the background necessary to appreciate Adorno’s critique by
offering an overview of Kantian animal ethics. Adorno was neither the first nor the last
philosopher to take issue with the treatment of animals in Kant’s moral philosophy. Among other
things, Kant has been criticized for referring to animals as “things,” “instruments,” and “mere
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means,” as well as for arguing that human beings have no direct moral obligations to animals.
Although Kantian moral philosophy does set limits on how we may use animals, these
limits are grounded in duties we have to each other. To understand why some have taken issue
with this, consider what Kant says about our duty to refrain from treating animals with cruelty.
According to Kant, animal cruelty is wrong not because of the harm it causes the animal, but
because of the psychological harm it may cause the abuser. Kant’s concern is that if we inure
ourselves to animal suffering we may become equally numb to the suffering of other humans. In
this way, Kant’s animal ethics are fundamentally anthropocentric. We have an obligation to our
fellow humans to treat animals humanely, but no such obligation to the animals themselves.
Adorno’s critique of Kant treads familiar territory in some respects, but it also goes
further than most in that it identifies a deeper issue with Kant’s moral philosophy that helps to
explain some of his objectionable conclusions about animals. According to Adorno, Kant’s view
of the human-animal relationship is informed by his disdain for the animality of the human
being. Kant’s antipathy toward the human being’s animal likeness leads him to erect a boundary
between the human and the animal. One consequence of this boundary is that it prevents the
human from extending compassion to its fellow creatures.
Chapter Two focuses primarily on Adorno’s critique of a central concept in Kant’s moral
philosophy: human dignity. By ascribing dignity exclusively to human beings, Kant effectively
separates them from nature and raises them above the other animals. Adorno argues that the
concept of human dignity is ideologically suspect because it reinforces a speciesist hierarchy. In
addition, it conceals the fact that humans themselves are also animals, and this leads to other
problems that are taken up in the third and final chapter.
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Chapter Three considers Adorno’s charge that Kantian idealism presents a warped view
of animality. Kant’s exaggerated distinction between the human and the animal gives rise to a
faulty conception of the human as a free and purely rational being that has transcended its
instinctual nature. In turn, animals are conceived as fundamentally irrational creatures that are
doomed to slavishly obey their own instincts.
Adorno argues that Kant’s contempt for the animal is directed equally at the animal
within the human. Indeed, Kant vacillates between denying the human being’s animal likeness
and invoking that likeness to insult individuals who do not meet his threshold of personhood.
Kant’s tendency to revile the animality of the human being leads Adorno to regard Kantian
idealism as a precursor to fascism. By insulting the human as an animal, Kant engages in the
same behavior that the Nazis would later adopt to persecute European Jews.
In response to the failures of the Kantian system, Adorno offers the concept of “animal
likeness” (Tierähnlichkeit) as a corrective. By reflecting on our likeness to animals (an act that is
discouraged in Kant), possibilities for improved relations with other animals become available.
Adorno seeks to foster reconciliation between humans and animals, as well as between humans
and our own animal nature, by encouraging us to embrace our animal likeness.

3

CHAPTER ONE:
KANT’S ANIMAL ETHICS

In this chapter I discuss the place of animals in Kant’s moral philosophy.1 To begin, I
consider Kant’s speculative account of the origin of reason in human beings. Kant believes that
before they discovered the power of reason, our ancestors lived a mere animal life as slaves to
instinct. Reason enabled them to free themselves from the compulsion of their instinctual nature
and allowed them to distinguish themselves from their fellow creatures (who remained in
bondage to nature). According to Kant, reason not only separates human beings from other
animals but also marks them out as the ultimate end of nature and grants them dominion over the
animal kingdom.
Next, I focus on Kant’s concept of human dignity and discuss how it informs his
understanding of the relation between humans and animals. Kant argues that as rational beings,
humans are able to engage in moral reasoning and act according to moral principles. On account
of this ability, human beings have intrinsic value or “dignity.” Since animals are nonrational

My account of Kant in this chapter is primarily an account of Adorno’s post-metaphysical
interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. There are several reasons why Adorno interprets Kant in this
way. One is simply this: after the anti-metaphysical turn in philosophy, certain aspects of Kant’s
practical philosophy and philosophy of history become impossible to accept. Accordingly,
Adorno offers an interpretation of Kant that is based on what is left of Kant’s philosophy once
the metaphysics are removed from it. Another reason why Adorno opts for a mostly nonmetaphysical reading of Kant is because he believes it is this version of Kant’s philosophy that
has caused the most harm politically and is therefore the most deserving of criticism.
Consequently, many of Adorno’s criticisms of Kant are not criticisms of Kant’s actual philosophy
but rather of the misappropriation and regressive political instrumentalization of his philosophy
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (I would like to thank Dr. Radu Neculau for assisting in
the clarification of these points.)
1
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beings, according to Kant, they cannot be moral agents and therefore lack dignity. Consequently,
human beings are not obliged to treat animals with respect, but instead may use them as mere
means to their own ends. As we shall see, Kant’s separation of humanity from animality leaves
him unable to reconcile the human being’s dignified rational nature with its undignified animal
nature.
Lastly, I examine Kant’s approach to animal ethics and explain how he determines what
kinds of actions toward animals are morally permissible. Although Kant maintains that we have
“indirect duties” regarding animals and are not permitted to ruthlessly exploit them, critics have
argued that Kant’s indirect duties fail to ground adequate moral concern for animals. To
conclude, I briefly consider Adorno’s positive assessment of Arthur Schopenhauer’s critique of
Kantian animal ethics.

I
In “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” Kant uses the story of Adam and Eve’s
departure from the Garden of Eden as a model to speculate about humanity’s emergence from its
animal past. His narrative begins with human beings in a state of nature: “Instinct, that voice of
God which all animals obey, must alone have guided [them].”2 Eventually, our ancestors felt the
first stirrings of reason, and over time they discovered they could use their rational faculties to
defy their natural impulses and make choices that were not governed by instinct. This marked a

Immanuel Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” in Anthropology, History, and
Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B.
Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 165.
2
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turning point in human history. Once they experienced a taste of freedom, it was impossible for
them to return to a life of servitude “under the dominion of instinct.”3
The birth and gradual development of reason placed an ever-widening gulf between
human beings and the rest of nature. Describing the moment when human beings first
distinguished themselves from other animals, Kant writes:
The […] last step that reason took in elevating the human being entirely above the society
with animals was that he comprehended (however obscurely) that he was the genuine end
of nature, and that in this nothing that lives on earth can supply a competitor to him. The
first time he said to the sheep: Nature has given you the skin you wear not for you but for
me, then took it off the sheep and put it on himself (Genesis 3:21), he became aware of a
prerogative that he had by his nature over all animals, which he now no longer regarded
as his fellow creatures, but rather as means and instruments given over to his will for the
attainment of his discretionary aims.4
As we shall see, Kant tempers the above remarks in his ethical writings when he places moral
restrictions on how we may use animals. Nevertheless, the idea that animals exist for the benefit
of humankind is one that Kant held consistently throughout his work.
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant further develops the idea that human beings are the
ultimate end of nature. Starting from the premise that everything in nature is interconnected as
means and ends, Kant argues that if we examine any natural being and ask ourselves why it
exists, we are led to the conclusion that it exists not for its own sake but for the sake of
something else. We find, for example, that plants exist for the nourishment of herbivorous
animals, and that herbivores in turn exist for the nourishment of carnivores. But in the end, the
question arises: for whom or what does the whole of nature exist? Kant answers:
For the human being, for the diverse uses which his understanding teaches him to make
3

Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” 166.
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Kant, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” 167.
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of all these creatures; and he is the ultimate end of the creation here on earth, because he
is the only being on earth who forms a concept of ends for himself and who by means of
his reason can make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things.5
Further on, he adds:
Man is indeed the only being on earth that has understanding and hence an ability to set
himself purposes of his own choice, and in this respect he holds the title of lord of nature;
and if we regard nature as a teleological system, then it is man’s vocation to be the
ultimate purpose of nature.6
According to Kant, nature exists for the sake of human beings because we alone have the
capacity to set ends for ourselves. The connection between these two ideas may not be entirely
obvious, so let me try to explain. As we have already seen, Kant believes that reason gives us the
ability to make choices independent of instinct. Consequently, we can set ends for ourselves that
extend beyond the ends of mere survival. Kant seems to think that the ends of nonrational beings
are much more closely tied to the satisfaction of their immediate needs, and therefore the kinds
of things that can serve as means for plants and animals are relatively limited. But for the human
being whose ends are potentially endless, everything in nature is potentially a means. For Kant,
these are sufficient reasons to conclude that nature exists to be appropriated for whatever ends
human beings may set for themselves.

II
So far we have seen that Kant distinguishes human beings from other animals primarily
on ontological grounds: unlike animals, human beings have a rational nature that gives them

Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 294-295.
5

6

Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 318.
7

autonomy with respect to their instincts. But in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant draws a further distinction, this time along moral lines, in order to establish that humans are
not to be counted among the beings in nature that may be treated as mere means:
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings
without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things,
whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as
an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and hence
so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect).7
Kant believes that human beings have an absolute and unconditional value that derives from their
rational nature. As ends in themselves, rational beings are to be regarded as “persons” worthy of
respect. In contrast, beings devoid of reason, such as animals, are to be regarded as mere “things”
whose worth derives solely from their usefulness to humans.
Kant expresses the distinction between persons and things once more in Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, where he links personhood to the concept of dignity:
The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely
above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the
unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person
—i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different beings from things, such as irrational
animals, with which one can do as one likes.8
The concept of dignity is key to understanding Kant’s view that human beings have intrinsic
value. He writes in the Groundwork:
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be
replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary
J. Gregor, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79.
7

Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in Anthropology, History, and
Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B.
Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 239.
8
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price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. What is related to general
human inclinations and needs has a market price; […] but that which constitutes the
condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative
worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity.9
Since animals are nothing more than “instruments” and “mere means,” they are to be valued in
terms of their market price, whereas the human being, by virtue of its dignity, is never to be
valued merely as a commodity.
It is important to note that despite his emphasis on the dignity of the human being, Kant
does not attribute dignity to the whole human being. In fact, he suggests in The Metaphysics of
Morals that the animality of the human being is devoid of dignity:
In the system of nature, a human being is a being of slight importance and shares with the
rest of the animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value. Although a human being
has, in his understanding, something more than they and can set himself ends, even this
gives him only an extrinsic value for his usefulness; that is to say, it gives one man a
higher value than another, that is, a price as of a commodity in exchange with these
animals as things […]. But a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a
morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person he is not to be valued
merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself,
that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for
himself from all other rational beings in the world.10
As we saw earlier, Kant believes that our capacity to set ends for ourselves authorizes us to use
the natural world for our own purposes. But here he suggests that while this capacity gives us an
advantage over the other animals, it is not for that reason the source of our dignity. Rather, what
makes us more valuable than the other animals is our capacity to set ends for ourselves in
accordance with moral principles. In other words, it is our moral capacity that gives us dignity.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant insists that reason should not be divorced from
9

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 84.

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor,
trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 557.
10
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morality, claiming that the human being who “use[s] reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction
of his needs” is no better than an animal.11 He continues:
[R]eason does not at all raise [the human being] in worth above mere animality if [it] is to
serve him only for the sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in
that case be only a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the
same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a higher end.12
According to Kant, the “higher end” reason has destined for human beings is moral perfection. In
Kantian ethics, a morally perfect individual is someone whose motives for acting dutifully are
not determined by instincts, impulses, or other inclinations that belong to the human as an animal
being.
In Kant’s view, only actions that are performed from a sense of duty have moral worth.
Doing the right thing simply because one feels inclined to do so is not sufficient. An action must
be motivated by duty in order to have moral worth, otherwise it cannot be considered a moral
action (even if it is done in conformity with duty). Kant illustrates this point in the Groundwork
with the example of a philanthropist who is beneficent to others despite being “cold and
indifferent to [their] sufferings.”13 Kant declares that “the worth of [the philanthropist’s]
character comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest, namely that he is beneficent
not from inclination but from duty.”14
Since inclinations are inferior sources of motivation for moral action, Kant thinks that we

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor,
trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 189.
11

12

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 189-190.
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Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 54.
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Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 54.
10

should strive as much as possible to act independently of them. In The Metaphysics of Morals, he
argues that moral perfection consists in “the purity of one’s disposition to duty, namely, in the
[moral] law being by itself alone the incentive, even without the admixture of aims derived from
sensibility, and in actions being done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty.”15
Striving for moral perfection, then, involves cultivating a moral disposition by acting solely on
the motive of duty.
For Kant, the motive of duty is a purely rational (and therefore moral) motive.
Inclinations, on the other hand, are not rational but “blind,” and can cloud our moral reasoning.16
Even “feeling[s] of compassion and tender sympathy” are burdensome in this respect, and Kant
says that “right-thinking persons” are better off without them.17 In The Metaphysics of Morals,
he claims that we cannot realize our humanity unless we overcome our inclinations: “A human
being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality, more and
more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends.”18 Only by
subordinating our impulses and instincts to the moral law can we set ends for ourselves that are
rational and moral.
Given his low view of inclinations, it is unsurprising that Kant does not consider the
animality of the human being to have dignity. In fact, he claims in the Groundwork that
inclinations “are so far from having an absolute worth […] that it must instead be the universal

15

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 566.

16

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 235.

17

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 235.
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wish of every rational being to be altogether free from them.”19 Ultimately, Kant believes that
“morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.”20
Due to the way that his system is structured, Kant is unable to reconcile human dignity
with human animality. As a result, he is forced to divide human nature in such a way that rational
nature can be regarded independently of animal nature. Kant attempts to do this in The
Metaphysics of Morals:
[The human being] can and should value himself by a low as well as by a high standard,
depending on whether he views himself as a sensible being (in terms of his animal
nature) or as an intelligible being (in terms of his moral predisposition). Since he must
regard himself not only as a person generally but also as a human being, that is, as a
person who has duties his own reason lays upon him, his insignificance as a human
animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a rational human being,
and he should not disavow the moral self-esteem of such a being.21
The distinction between the sensible being and the intelligible being also appears in the
Groundwork, although in that text the distinction is much more radical. Kant argues that there are
two ways the human being can regard itself: either as a sensible being belonging to the world of
sense, or as an intelligible being belonging to the world of understanding. Everything that
happens in the world of sense is determined by natural causes. Human action, when viewed from
the standpoint of the world of sense, must be regarded as determined by instincts, impulses, and
inclinations. But the human is more than just a sensible being, Kant argues, for the human being
“finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, even from

19

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 79.
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Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 557.
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himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is reason.”22
Describing reason as “pure self-activity,” Kant claims that the spontaneity of reason
transfers the human being into an order of things that is altogether different from the order of
nature.23 Consequently, “a rational being must regard himself […] as belonging not to the world
of sense but to the world of understanding.”24 When viewed from the standpoint of the world of
understanding, the human must be regarded as an intelligible being whose actions originate from
reason. Such a being is considered free from the determining causes of the world of sense.
Kant’s postulate of the intelligible being can be interpreted as an extreme attempt to
distance the human being from its animality. The treatment of human animality in Kant’s
philosophy is something that will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Three. For now, let us
turn to a discussion of Kant’s animal ethics.

III
Despite the fact that some of his own statements give the impression that we are
permitted to treat animals however we wish, Kant maintains that we have certain duties
regarding animals. One such duty is to avoid treating them with cruelty. Kant writes in The
Metaphysics of Morals:
The human being is authorized to kill animals quickly (without pain) and to put them to
work that does not strain them beyond their capacities (such as work he himself must
submit to). But agonizing physical experiments for the sake of mere speculation, when

22

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 99.
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the end could also be achieved without these, are to be abhorred.25
In his ethics lectures, Kant implies that vivisection is justified in cases where animal
experimentation is necessary to achieve a scientifically important end. “[W]hen anatomists take
living animals to experiment on,” he states, “that is certainly cruelty, though there it is employed
for a good purpose; because animals are regarded as man’s instruments, it is acceptable.”26 He
adds, however, that killing animals for sport is never acceptable.27
Kant also encourages acts of kindness and affection toward animals. In The Metaphysics
of Morals, he insists that work animals ought to be treated with gratitude, “just as if they were
members of the household.”28 In his ethics lectures, Kant notes with approval that after Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz was finished with a grub he had been observing, he reportedly put it “back on
the tree with its leaf, lest he should be guilty of doing any harm to it.”29 Put simply, Kant believes
that “[a]ny action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat
them without love, is demeaning to ourselves.”30
One could argue that these remarks make Kant less vulnerable to the criticism that he
fails to grant animals appropriate moral consideration. However, it should be noted that when
Kant says that we have duties regarding animals, he does not mean that we have duties to

25

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 564.

Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 213.
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animals. In The Metaphysics of Morals, he denies that we can have duties to beings other than
humans:
As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings
(himself and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject’s
will. Hence the constraining (binding) subject must, first, be a person; and this person
must, secondly, be given as an object of experience, since the human being is to strive for
the end of this person’s will and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two
beings that exist.31
This passage suggests that animals lack the capacity to place us under moral constraint because
they are not persons with wills. Furthermore, if having a duty to someone consists in striving to
achieve the end of that person’s will, we cannot have duties to beings that lack the capacity to set
ends for themselves. As we have already seen, Kant believes that humans are the only beings in
nature whose ends are not determined by their survival instincts but are determined instead by
their own autonomous reason.
If our duties regarding animals are not duties to animals, according to Kant, then to
whom are these duties owed? Since we can only have duties to other human beings, it follows
that our duties regarding animals are duties owed to ourselves and others. Kant explains in the
Metaphysics of Morals:
A human being can […] have no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he
thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of reflection, and
his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this
misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those
beings.32
According to Kant, we can only have duties to another being if that being morally constrains us
by its will. We may, however, have duties regarding another being if our treatment of that being
31

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 563.

32
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happens to be involved somehow in fulfilling our duties to another being. In the context of
Kant’s animal ethics, this means that we have duties to ourselves and others that involve animals
but no direct duties to the animals themselves.
In his ethics lectures, Kant claims that our treatment of animals can affect how we treat
other human beings. Consequently, we should try to view animals as “analogs of humanity,” and
treat them accordingly.33 He explains:
If a dog, for example, has served his master long and faithfully, that is an analogy of
human service; hence I must reward it, and once the dog can serve no longer, I must look
after him to the end […]. If a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living
for him, he is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable
of judgment, but he thereby damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which
he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to mankind. Lest he extinguish such qualities,
he must already practice a similar kindliness towards animals; for a person who already
displays such cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards men.34
In a subsequent lecture, Kant declares that animal cruelty “is inhuman, and contains an analogy
of violation of the duty to ourselves, since we would not, after all, treat ourselves with cruelty.”35
By acting cruelly toward animals, “we stifle the instinct of humaneness within us and make
ourselves devoid of feeling; it is thus an indirect violation of humanity in our own person.”36
This point is also stressed in The Metaphysics of Morals:
With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and cruel treatment of
animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s duty to himself, and he has a
duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens
and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s
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relations with other people.37
Kant believes that if we develop a habit of treating animals cruelly, we are more likely to treat
human beings cruelly, thereby violating our duty to treat human beings as ends in themselves.
Ultimately, violent behavior toward animals is wrong because it desensitizes us to human
suffering.
Given the contempt Kant shows elsewhere for moral feeling, it is curious that in his
discussion of animals he emphasizes the importance of compassion. More curious still, despite
his insistence that animals are mere things, Kant recognizes that they do feel pain. He even goes
so far as to say that animals are analogous to human beings and that their actions sometimes
resemble those of virtuous individuals. It should be noted, however, that these last two ideas only
appear in Kant’s early ethics lectures and later drop out of his thought entirely. Nevertheless, this
change indicates that Kant may have been conflicted at one point about how to view the
relationship between humans and animals, and that he may have been hesitant to posit an
absolute divide between them. These tensions in Kant’s thought will be taken up again in
subsequent chapters.

IV
To conclude this chapter, I would like to summarize the principles that inform Kant’s
animal ethics and restate the main conclusions he draws from them about how animals are to be
treated. I will then briefly present Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant, which Adorno regarded
favorably.
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Kant’s moral philosophy is based on the idea that reason has absolute and unconditional
value. Beings who possess a rational nature are called “persons.” By virtue of their rational
nature, persons have a dignity that is to be respected; they are to be treated as ends in themselves
and not merely as means. Persons also have the capacity to determine their own ends, and this
enables them to place other persons under moral constraint. Such is the basis of all duty. In Kant,
duties are owed to persons alone.
Beings who do not possess a rational nature are called “things.” Things merely have an
extrinsic value and may be used exclusively as a means to an end. Since things lack the rational
capacity to place persons under moral constraint, persons cannot have duties to things.
While Kant maintains that nothing in nature is off limits for human use, he observes that
there are certain moral restrictions that set limits on how we may use natural things, such as
animals. For example, we have a duty to refrain from treating animals with cruelty. Kant also
claims that by expressing kindness, gratitude, and even affection toward animals, we show
respect for humanity. “Respect is always directed only to persons,” he reminds us, “never to
things. The latter can awaken in us inclination and even love if they are animals (e.g., horses,
dogs, and so forth), or also fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect.”38
Even though animals are not beings to whom we owe respect, Kant thinks that for moral
purposes we are permitted to view them as analogs of humanity. When we treat animals
humanely, we indirectly observe our duties to each other. Likewise, when we treat animals
cruelly, we indirectly violate those duties. Our duties regarding animals are therefore “indirect
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duties to humanity.”39
Critics have argued that Kant’s indirect duties fail to ground adequate moral concern for
animals. Schopenhauer, for example, was particularly displeased with Kant’s anthropocentric
view of compassion. As Christina Gerhardt notes, Schopenhauer criticizes Kantian moral
philosophy “for how it deems animals not as equals worthy of our compassion but rather as
creatures that allow us to exercise our compassion for other humans.”40 In On the Basis of
Morality, Schopenhauer points to the passage in The Metaphysics of Morals, quoted above,
where Kant condemns animal cruelty on the grounds that it damages our capacity to empathize
with human suffering. “[T]hus only for practice are we to have sympathy for animals,”
Schopenhauer remarks, adding: “I regard such propositions as revolting and abominable.”41
In Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno commends Schopenhauer for calling attention
to the shortcomings of Kant’s moral philosophy:
In his day Schopenhauer held it to be the particular merit of his own moral philosophy
that it also included a view of our treatment of animals, compassion for animals, and this
has often been regarded as the cranky idea of a private individual of independent means.
My own view is that a tremendous amount can be learnt from such crankiness.42
While Adorno considers Schopenhauer’s compassion-based moral philosophy to be an
improvement over Kant’s moral philosophy, his own philosophical project aims to go beyond
39
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compassion by “changing the circumstances that give rise to the need for it.”43 In the proceeding
chapters, I argue that Adorno aims to change the hierarchical structure that sets human beings
over other animals by exposing and critiquing the faulty conception of animality that underlies
our nature-dominating society.
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CHAPTER TWO:
ADORNO ON DIGNITY

In this chapter I attempt to elucidate Adorno’s critique of the concept of human dignity in
Kant. I begin by situating Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s philosophy within the broader
context of Adorno’s critique of the enlightenment, before moving to a discussion of Adorno’s
assessment of Kantian ethics. Among other things, Adorno accuses Kant of attributing dignity to
human beings in order to give them a practical advantage over animals. By depriving animals of
dignity and reducing them to mere “things,” Kant delivers the animal over to the human as an
object of instrumental action. In this way, Kant’s definition of the human being as a dignified
“person” covertly legitimizes human supremacy and the domination of nature.
Next, I consider Adorno’s critique of capitalism and his analysis of the shared suffering
humans and animals experience as a result of being treated as commodities. Adorno argues that
capitalism makes a mockery of human dignity by objectifying individuals and reducing them to
their exchange value. Unlike Kant, who ascribes to human beings a transcendental dignity that
cannot be damaged by the empirical world, Adorno seeks to recapture the critical potential of the
concept of dignity by formulating it as an ideal rather than as a positive given. Doing so allows
him to criticize capitalism on the grounds that it thwarts the realization of human dignity.
Lastly, I examine a somewhat cryptic passage from Minima Moralia in which Adorno
suggests that the names of animals have a non-exchangeable quality that defies or resists the
capitalist tendency to make all things fungible. This non-exchangeable quality (which Kant
associates with dignity) has all but vanished from our commodified world. Yet Adorno suggests
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that it is precisely in the names of the very beings to whom Kant denies dignity that the
possibility of dignity is preserved.

I
Adorno’s distrust of certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy stems from the fact that as an
enlightenment thinker, Kant belongs to an intellectual tradition whose aims Adorno finds
objectionable. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and his colleague Max Horkheimer claim
that the goal of the enlightenment was the domination of nature.44 As we shall see, one of the
reasons why Adorno believes that the domination of nature is wrong is because animals suffer as
a consequence.
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the enlightenment fundamentally changed the way
that humans related to nature. In their pursuit to “disenchant” nature with science, the thinkers of
the enlightenment adopted a reductive and instrumentalizing stance toward the natural world.
Specifically, they sought to mathematize nature with the aim of deriving formulas and equations
that would enable them to predict and control nature more effectively. The enlightenment’s
disenchantment of nature gradually removed moral and religious barriers to the unrestrained and
instrumental use of nature by humans. The belief that nature is sacred or intrinsically valuable
was replaced by a conception of nature as meaningless matter. From that point forward, the
natural world was to be viewed as a tool for humans to employ in their own interests.
According to Adorno, the enlightenment desire to dominate nature finds its purest
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2002), passim.
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expression in Kant’s philosophy. All the elements are there: Kant’s distinction between persons
and things, his view that human beings are the ultimate end of nature, his insistence that the
value of natural things is reducible to their market price—these ideas work together to separate
humans from nature while transforming nature into an object to be dominated and exploited.
Adorno’s most scathing critique of Kant comes from an unlikely source: an unfinished
and posthumously published book on Ludwig van Beethoven. Casting suspicion on Kant’s
concept of human dignity, Adorno observes that by attributing dignity to humans and denying it
to animals, Kant raises the human above the animal and legitimizes the domination of animals by
humans. The following passage was discovered in Adorno’s preparatory notes for the work:
What I find so suspect in Kantian ethics is the “dignity” which they attribute to man in
the name of autonomy. A capacity for moral self-determination is ascribed to human
beings as an absolute advantage—as a moral profit—while being covertly used to
legitimize dominance—dominance over nature. […] Ethical dignity in Kant is a
demarcation of differences. It is directed against animals. Implicitly it excludes man from
nature, so that its humanity threatens incessantly to revert to the inhuman. It leaves no
room for compassion [Mitleid]. Nothing is more abhorrent to the Kantian than a reminder
of man’s animal likeness [Tieränlichkeit]. This taboo is always at work when the idealist
berates the materialist. Animals play for the idealist system virtually the same role as the
Jews for fascism. To revile man as an animal—that is genuine idealism. To deny the
possibility of salvation for animals absolutely and at any price is the inviolable boundary
of its metaphysics.45
Here Adorno observes that human beings have a lot to gain from believing in their own dignified
status. If humans are the only beings on earth who have dignity, then the respect they are obliged
to show each other does not extend to other animals. Consequently, there is nothing preventing
them from using and abusing other animals for their own benefit. Adorno suspects it is with this
material interest in mind that Kant attributes dignity to human beings. The irony is not lost on
Theodor W. Adorno, Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998), 80, trans. mod.
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Adorno that in Kant, the alleged dignity of the human being becomes the justification for the
undignified treatment of the animal.
Perhaps the most damning aspect of Kant’s ethical system, in Adorno’s view, is that it
prevents human beings from identifying with the suffering of other animals. To show solidarity
with creatures who suffer like us is to acknowledge our affinity with them. But such an
acknowledgment is discouraged in Kant, which is why Adorno says that his moral philosophy
“leaves no room for compassion.” This echoes Schopenhauer’s criticism that in Kantian animal
ethics, compassionate actions are never performed for the sake of the animals themselves. In
fact, we are only encouraged to show compassion to animals in order to cultivate empathy for
our fellow humans. We are not permitted to have boundless compassion for animals. Instead, we
are required to hold back, always keeping in mind those for whom our duties regarding animals
are actually performed: ourselves and other human beings.
Here I would like to briefly consider a possible objection to Adorno. Given that Kant
condemns “[a]ny action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or
otherwise treat them without love,”46 Adorno’s charge that Kantian moral philosophy sanctions
the domination of animals may seem unfounded. However, it is important to understand that
Adorno’s conception of domination includes more than just cruelty and violence. On this point,
Alison Stone explains:
To dominate a being, for the Frankfurt School generally, is to “prescribe” to it “goals and
purposes and means of striving for and attaining them” which differ from those that the
being would spontaneously adopt. Living natural beings, then, are dominated when they
are forced out of the courses of development and behavior which they would
spontaneously pursue. Calling this “domination,” not merely “control,” implies that is it
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undesirable; this, for Adorno, is because living beings suffer (leiden) from having their
spontaneous tendencies thwarted.47
Stone notes that while Adorno never explains why he believes the domination of nature is wrong,
he does imply
that dominating living natural beings prevents them from developing or behaving as they
spontaneously would. This makes these beings suffer, because it thwarts their needs to
develop spontaneously—just as, for Adorno, human beings suffer when their bodily
needs go unfulfilled. Since this bodily suffering “ought not to be” when it occurs in
human beings, the same suffering ought not to arise in non-human living beings, and any
practice […] which causes or exacerbates such suffering deserves criticism.48
Kantian moral philosophy deserves to be criticized because it legitimizes human dominance over
animals. When we treat animals the way Kant views them, exclusively in terms of their value for
the satisfaction of our desires, we damage animals and prevent them from developing
spontaneously. This causes them to suffer. Therefore, while Kant does not condone cruelty to
animals, his moral philosophy permits animals to be used for food, labor, clothing, experiments,
and other purposes that are opposed to their needs.49
Due to their indirect nature, Kant’s duties regarding animals are unable to accommodate
the needs of animals. In fact, they only stipulate how animals are to be treated based on how their
response to our treatment of them might positively or negatively affect us. Kantian animal ethics
is solely concerned with the question of how we are to use animals; the question of whether we
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should be using them at all is not open for debate. This is why Adorno contends that “the
possibility of salvation for animals” is denied “absolutely” in Kant.

II
Adorno argues that human beings have sought to dominate nature for thousands of years.
In Negative Dialectics, he claims that the domination of nature “cements the discontinuous,
chaotically splintered moments and phases of history.”50 He also suggests that we can trace the
domination of nature by looking at how animals have been treated in human societies. In
Problems of Moral Philosophy, he claims that the “most obvious and tangible expression” of the
domination of nature is to be found in the “exploitation and maltreatment of animals.”51 In
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer reflect on the enormous animal suffering
that has been part of the process of civilization:
In war and peace, arena and slaughterhouse, from the slow death of the elephant
overpowered by primitive human hordes with the aid of the first planning to the perfected
exploitation of the animal world today, the unreasoning creature has always suffered at
the hands of reason.52
Animals have suffered at the hands of reason in two senses. Not only has reason been used as a
tool to exploit animals, but the belief that animals lack reason has also been used against them as
an excuse to disregard their well-being.
While the domination of nature is not a new historical phenomenon, Adorno and
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Horkheimer argue that such domination has reached its peak in late capitalism. The level of
technological progress achieved under capitalism has taken “society’s domination of nature to
unimagined heights.”53 Not only are the methods of animal exploitation at our disposal more
sophisticated than ever, the sheer amount of animal life we are now capable of destroying
(whether directly or indirectly) is equally unprecedented.
Throughout his work, Adorno criticizes a number of practices aimed at controlling and
exploiting animals. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, for example, he condemns the “abominable
physiological laboratories” of behavioral psychologists who were known to conduct torturous
experiments on animals.54 In Minima Moralia, he targets more subtle forms of animal
domination, such as Carl Hagenbeck’s “open zoo” design, which uses trenches instead of bars to
separate the animals from zoo visitors. Adorno argues that these exhibits “deny the animals’
freedom only the more completely by keeping the boundaries invisible, the sight of which would
inflame the longing for open spaces.”55 They also create the illusion for onlookers that the
animals are not in captivity, that they are not trapped. While the “tiger endlessly pacing back and
forth in his cage reflects back negatively, through his bewilderment, something of humanity,” the
one “frolicking behind the pit too wide to leap” elicits no guilt.56
Adorno observes that such attempts to better approximate the zoo animals’ natural
habitats reveal just how far society’s domination of nature has progressed:
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The more purely nature is preserved and transplanted by civilization, the more
implacably it is dominated. We can now afford to encompass even larger natural units,
and leave them apparently intact within our grasp, whereas previously the selecting and
taming of particular items bore witness to the difficulty we still had in coping with
nature.57
In his lectures on aesthetics, Adorno contends that “pure nature—that is to say, a nature that has
not gone through the mediation processes of society—does not exist.”58 He illustrates the extent
to which nature has been mediated by social practices in his History and Freedom lectures:
If you think of the role played by nature today, in the ordinary sense of nature in a
landscape as contrasted with our urban, industrial civilization, you will realize that this
nature is already something planned, cultivated and organized. It is gradually turning into
a nature reserve (if I may exaggerate somewhat) and—as the director of the Frankfurt
Zoo has frequently pointed out—it is already becoming a problem literally to protect the
natural space that wild animals need if they are to be able to move around freely.59
Adorno makes a similar point in a different lecture series when he laments the fact that
“civilization has driven the wildest and most exotic animals into the most inaccessible jungles.”60
He claims in Dialectic of Enlightenment that society has forgotten about wild animals, arguing
that we are only reminded of their existence when the last of a species perishes.61 Passages like
these demonstrate that Adorno was well-aware of the plight of animals in late capitalism.
The technological domination of nature is central to Adorno’s critique of capitalism. But
he is also equally critical of the commodification of nature and the reduction of living beings to
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their exchange value. In what follows, I discuss Adorno’s account of exchange relations and his
analysis of the damage such relations have inflicted on both human and nonhuman animals.

III
Perhaps the best way to approach an explanation of exchange relations is to relate them to
a phenomenon that we have already discussed. Earlier I noted that one of the primary means by
which the enlightenment sought to disenchant nature was to conceptualize it mathematically.
This is an instance of what Adorno calls “identity thinking.” Generally speaking, identity
thinking refers to the act of unreflectively reducing objects in the world to our concepts of them.
To identify an object with a concept is to assume that there is nothing “outside” the concept, or
that the concept so perfectly encapsulates the object that the two are identical.
Against this idea, Adorno contends that there is always a nonidentical relationship
between concept and object. There are two ways in which concepts fail to match up exactly with
objects. Due to their abstract universality, concepts necessarily contain less in their descriptions
of objects than what is actually (or potentially) present in them. Concepts are ill-equipped to
express what is unique about particular objects because particulars are always “more” than the
universals they stand under. As Adorno observes in Negative Dialectics: “[O]bjects do not go
into their concepts without leaving a remainder.”62
At the same time, concepts themselves are always “more” than the objects they subsume.
Contained in every concept is something extra that is not found in the object. This surplus could
be a quality that has been exaggerated, imagined, or projected onto the object. Alternatively, the
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concept could contain a speculative element that expresses or anticipates something about the
object’s potential that has not yet been realized.
Adorno maintains that concepts do an injustice to objects by presuming to exhaust them.
Identity thinking is inherently coercive because it demands that the object conform to the concept
imposed on it. The object is not permitted to be anything other than what the concept tells it to
be. Any qualities in the object that exceed the bounds of the concept are expunged.
The coerciveness of identity thinking is evident in attempts to conceptualize nature in
purely mathematical terms. Science is guilty of identity thinking when it views natural
phenomena as embodying mathematical structures or when it conflates its own models of reality
with reality as such. By stripping away the qualities of natural things and reducing them to
measurable quantities, science forces the diversity of nature into a single, totalizing conceptual
unity.
Adorno and Horkheimer draw a parallel between the mathematization of nature and
commodification under capitalism when they observe that the principle of exchange, the
fundamental organizing principle of capitalist society, “makes dissimilar things comparable by
reducing them to abstract quantities.”63 In accordance with the exchange principle, unequal or
nonidentical things are reduced to their exchange value in order to be made commensurable. The
exchange principle is just as coercive as identity thinking in its demand for sameness. But
whereas identity thinking uses concepts and conceptual schemas to bring objects into conformity
with thought, the exchange principle forces individuals into social conformity by absorbing them
into the complex relations of exchange that govern capitalist society.
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In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that exchange relations and identity thinking
mutually reinforce each other:
The exchange principle […] is fundamentally akin to the principle of identification.
Exchange is the social model of the principle, and without the principle there would be no
exchange; it is through exchange that non-identical individuals and performances become
commensurable and identical. The spread of the principle imposes on the whole world an
obligation to become identical, to become total.64
Adorno underscores the coercive character of exchange relations when he observes that
individuals are required “to respect the law of exchange if [they] do not wish to be destroyed.”65
To survive in late capitalism, individuals must adapt to the economy; their self-preservation
depends on how useful they make themselves to capital and how effectively they subserve the
exchange principle. Driven by the fear of financial insecurity to integrate themselves into the
social totality, individuals embrace their functions as agents and bearers of exchange value.
Here the analogy between exchange relations and identity thinking is especially apt.66
Similar to how identity thinking effaces qualities in the object that cannot be assimilated to the
concept, exchange relations assimilate individuals to the social totality by flattening out the
differences between them. On this point, Deborah Cook observes:
Under the monopoly conditions that characterize late capitalism, individuals stand in
much the same relation to society as particulars stand to universal concepts. Adorno
suggests this throughout his work when he refers to society as the “universal.” Where
identity thinking summarily subsumes objects under concepts, society reifies individuals,
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expunging their idiosyncrasies by subsuming them under abstract exchange relations.67
Virtually all aspects of human life have been damaged in some way by the homogenizing and
leveling effects of exchange relations. This constitutes domination in the Adornian sense. The
demand placed on individuals to adapt and conform to economic conditions prevents them from
fulfilling their need to develop spontaneously, and this causes them to suffer.
Adorno’s critique of exchange relations highlights the universality of suffering under
capitalism. As contradictory as it may sound, Adorno argues that while capitalism gives human
beings control over nature, human beings themselves have no control over capitalism. In fact,
individuals are subjected to the same mechanisms of exploitation and domination that are
directed against the natural world. Catching everything in their web, exchange relations have
damaged humans and animals alike. The exchange principle does not discriminate when it
reduces human and nonhuman animals to their exchange value, and it damages them both by
putting a price on them and treating them as mere means.

IV
Before returning to Adorno’s discussion of dignity, I would like to address a
misunderstanding that may have arisen in the course of this chapter regarding the nature of
Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s philosophy. I may have given the impression that Adorno is
overly dismissive of Kant, or that he finds nothing redeemable in Kant’s thought. But this is not
the case. As Gerhardt notes, Adorno was deeply influenced by Kant and remained one of the
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most Kantian members of the Frankfurt School.68 She describes his critical engagement with
Kant’s philosophy as follows:
Adorno was Kantian not in the sense of blindly adhering to Kant’s philosophy but rather
in the sense of aspiring to understand the shortcomings of that philosophy’s logic and
how they impeded the realization of idealism’s ideals. Thus, Adorno’s critiques of Kant’s
logic are intended to strengthen its aspirations. […] With this in mind, it is with, rather
than against, Kant that Adorno critiques Kant’s philosophy.69
As we shall see, Adorno believes that there are elements of the concept of dignity worth
preserving. Despite its ideological character, the truth content in the concept of dignity lies in its
conviction that some things should not be exchanged.
In Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno speculates that Kant must have recognized the
emerging capitalist tendency “for everything to become merely a means,” and his desire to resist
that tendency motivated him to create the distinction between dignity and price.70 Elaborating on
the distinction, Adorno observes:
[In Kant,] everything [that] is functional, that exists for the sake of something else and
that is exchangeable, has its price—just as of course the concept of price is based on the
process of exchange. In contrast whatever exists strictly for its own sake, or happens for
its own sake, […] possesses what he calls “dignity.”71
Here we can detect a hint of ambivalence in Adorno’s attitude toward the concept of dignity. On
the one hand, the concept of dignity serves an ideological function by reinforcing the belief that
human beings are absolutely independent of nature and radically distinct from other animals. On
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the other hand, if appropriated from Kant’s philosophy and employed in an emancipatory
manner, the concept of dignity could be used to criticize capitalist society on the grounds that it
fails to treat individuals with dignity.
Praising the critical bent of Kant’s philosophy, Adorno observes that Kant “never simply
repeats what goes on in society, but [tends] to criticize existing society and to hold up to it an
alternative image of the possible.”72 From a Kantian perspective, exchange relations deserve to
be criticized because they rob human beings of dignity. But here Adorno turns Kant against
himself. If exchange relations are to be criticized for robbing human beings of dignity, then
Kantian philosophy is to be criticized for doing the same to animals. Kantian philosophy loses its
critical edge and sides with the capitalist tendency when it views animals not as beings that exist
for their own sake but rather as things that exist for the sake of exchange.
Adorno’s ambivalence toward the concept of dignity is captured in a passage from
Aesthetic Theory. In the chapter on natural beauty, Adorno argues that the exclusion of natural
beauty from idealist aesthetics in favor of the concept of human dignity bears witness to the
intensification of society’s domination of nature:
Natural beauty vanished from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the
concept of freedom and human dignity, which was inaugurated by Kant and then
rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel; in accord with this concept
nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the autonomous subject
has itself to thank. The truth of such freedom for the subject, however, is at the same time
unfreedom: unfreedom for the other. For this reason the turn against natural beauty, in
spite of the immeasurable progress it made possible in the comprehending of art as
spiritual, does not lack an element of destructiveness, just as the concept of dignity does
not lack it in its turn against nature. […] If the case of natural beauty were pending,
dignity would be found culpable for having raised the human animal above the animal.
[…] Human beings are not equipped positively with dignity; rather, dignity would be
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exclusively what they have yet to achieve.73
Recall that in the Groundwork, Kant argues that the human being’s capacity for reason takes it
out of the world of sense (in which its actions are determined by natural causes) and transfers it
into the world of understanding (in which its actions are determined by reason). As a member of
the world of understanding, the human being is autonomous with respect to its own natural
impulses and can act freely in accordance with moral principles. According to Kant, it is by
virtue of this capacity for moral self-determination that human beings have absolute and
unconditional value (i.e. dignity). In contrast, nature does not have dignity because unlike
humanity, nature is not free.
Adorno observes that in Kant, freedom is a quality that is ascribed to human beings only
after they have been separated from nature and nature itself has been consigned to the realm of
unfreedom. Freedom in Kant is therefore an exclusionary kind of freedom, one that is based on
the unfreedom of nature and attributed to human beings at nature’s expense.
But there is also another sense in which human freedom spells unfreedom for nature. In
Kant, animals already lack freedom because as creatures belonging to the world of sense, they do
not possess the capacity for reason needed to liberate them from enslavement to their own
instincts. By granting the human dominion over the animal, however, Kant ensures that the
unfreedom of the animal is overdetermined. Kantian philosophy is designed to keep animals in a
state of unfreedom by encouraging humans to treat animals as objects that exist exclusively for
their own benefit. As a result, the very unfreedom Kant ascribes to animals in theory is imposed
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by humans in practice.
Adorno ultimately rejects Kant’s view that human beings possess dignity as a positive
trait, arguing instead that dignity ought to be conceived only as that which humanity has not yet
achieved. Adorno’s negative formulation of the concept dignity is an instance of “nonidentity
thinking.” In contrast to identity thinking, which registers in objects only those characteristics
already contained in the concepts imposed on them, nonidentity thinking recognizes that objects
are distinct from concepts and that the relationship between them is nonidentical.
Nonidentity thinking seeks to rescue objects from the coerciveness of identity thinking.
As we saw earlier, one of the ways in which identity thinking damages objects is by pressing
them into the mold of rigid and static concepts. In the sciences, for example, identity thinking
occurs in the service of domination when it subsumes nature under abstract mathematical
models. Commenting on the link between theoretical and practical domination, Stone notes that
scientists first attempt to work out how to manipulate mathematical elements conceptually
because this enables them to manipulate and control nature in practice.74 And of course, identity
thinking reinforces domination outside the domain of scientific inquiry as well when it equates
natural things with their exchange value in the capitalist marketplace.
Although Adorno tends to stresses the damage inflicted on objects by reductionistic
identity thinking, he also warns of the kind of thinking that is equally unreflective in identifying
objects with concepts that exceed them. Such concepts include, but are not limited to, those that
express ideals. The danger in falsely presenting an object as having fulfilled its concept is that it
stifles the critical impulse needed to help the object realize its better potential. Thought betrays
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the potential in objects and cheats them of what they could be when it announces that potential as
having already been achieved.
Rather than prematurely ascribe dignity to human beings, Adorno submits the concept of
dignity to the scrutiny of nonidentity thinking. Since nonidentity thinking is able to recognize the
gap between concepts and objects, it can use that awareness to expose and critique the social and
economic conditions that create a disparity between the concept of dignity and the individuals to
whom the concept refers. In doing so, nonidentity thinking points toward the possibility of
improved conditions in which the ideal of dignity would be realized.

V
In the passage from Aesthetic Theory quoted above, Adorno argues that in idealism, the
emergence of the concept of human dignity corresponded with a decline in interest in natural
beauty. But natural beauty is not the only thing that idealist philosophers have overlooked. As we
shall see, Adorno believes that there are utopian possibilities hidden in the world of animals,
possibilities that escape our notice when we dismiss other animals as being unworthy of our
attention.
Adorno often looks for possibilities in unconventional places. In Minima Moralia, for
example, he turns to seemingly mundane activities, objects, and interactions in search of ideas
can that point, however indirectly, to the possibility of what might lay beyond damaged life.
Adorno believes that exchange relations have become so pervasive that it is difficult for
individuals to think of alternatives. Not only is it a struggle for them to grasp possibilities in
thought, they are also unable to seize on actionable possibilities that would threaten the status
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quo because doing so would adversely affect their survival prospects and undermine their ability
to adapt and conform to economic conditions. In light of these problems, Adorno believes that by
reflecting on their own subjective experiences, individuals might be able to discover possibilities
that have not yet been absorbed by exchange relations.
Adorno’s attempt to salvage possibilities from the wreckage of damaged life is no better
demonstrated than in the aphorism from Minima Moralia entitled “Toy Shop.” Reflecting on
childhood experience, Adorno considers the subversive nature of toys and suggests that the
possibility of undamaged life is expressed through the play of children:
Hebbel, in a surprising entry in his diary, asks what takes away “life’s magic in later
years.” “It is because in all the brightly-colored contorted marionettes, we see the
revolving cylinder that sets them in motion, and because for this very reason the
captivating variety of life is reduced to wooden monotony. A child seeing the tightropewalkers singing, the pipers playing, the girls fetching water, the coachmen driving, thinks
all this is happening for the joy of doing so; he can’t imagine that these people also have
to eat and drink, go to bed and get up again. We however, know what is at stake.”
Namely, earning a living, which commandeers all those activities as mere means, reduces
them to interchangeable, abstract labor-time.75
Life has an enchanted quality for children because unlike adults, they are able to imagine that
everything going on around them is happening for its own sake rather than for the sake of
exchange. Moreover, since they are largely unaware of the extent to which work in capitalist
society is performed under compulsion, children are able to believe that people engage in work
simply for the joy of doing so.
This way of viewing of the world is reflected in the actual play of children. Arguing that
play is the child’s defense against the universal subordination of activities to the exchange
principle, Adorno observes:
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In his purposeless activity the child […] deprives the things with which he plays of their
mediated usefulness […] [and] seeks to rescue in them what is benign towards men and
not what subserves the exchange relation that equally deforms men and things. The little
trucks travel nowhere and the tiny barrels on them are empty; yet they remain true to their
destiny by not performing, not participating in the process of abstraction that levels down
that destiny, but instead abide as allegories of what they are specifically for.76
By engaging in play that imitates work, children “unconsciously rehearse the right life.”77 As an
activity that is carried out for its own sake, play is transgressive. Not only does the playful act
subtly resist the exchange principle by refusing to abide by it, it also expresses the possibility of
transformed conditions in which work would be freed from compulsion.
In the same aphorism, Adorno suggests that utopian possibilities are reflected in the
child’s experience of animals:
The relation of children to animals depends entirely on the fact that Utopia goes disguised
in the creatures whom Marx78 even begrudged the surplus value they contribute as
workers. In existing without any purpose recognizable to men, animals hold out, as if for
expression, their own names, utterly impossible to exchange. This makes them so
beloved of children, their contemplation so blissful. I am a rhinoceros [Nashorn],
signifies the shape of the rhinoceros.79
Like everything else the child encounters in the world, animals appear to exist for their own sake.
According to Adorno, what children find so delightful about the rhinoceros is that its name
expresses a non-exchangeable or non-fungible quality. Unlike most things in capitalist society,
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names for the most part cannot be exchanged. The joy that children receive from contemplating
the names of animals is the same joy they receive from playing with toys. Importantly, these
activities involve things that do not subserve the exchange principle and can therefore be enjoyed
for their own sake.
“[A]mid universal fungibility,” Adorno writes, “happiness attaches without exception to
the non-fungible.”80 The happiness that the non-fungible excites in children (a happiness that can
perhaps be recaptured through the remembrance of childhood) offers a glimpse of what life
outside the domination of exchange relations might hold. Perhaps, as Adorno suggests in
Towards a New Manifesto, “[a]nimals could teach us what happiness is.”81
Commenting on the “Toy Shop” aphorism, Oshrat C. Silberbusch considers what
Adorno’s cryptic remarks about the rhinoceros might mean more generally for his view of
animals:
The rhino is simply there, without any other claim than being there, as rhino, a claim that
turns out to be weightier than it seems. The animal’s presence does not stand for
something else, it is an end in itself, as Kant would say (except that he, like most
philosophers, reserved that dignity to human beings alone).82
According to Silberbusch, Adorno seeks to restore to animals the very dignity denied to them by
Kant. Other commentators have made this observation as well. Camilla Flodin offers a similar
reading of Adorno, interpreting his critique of dignity as an attempt to broaden the concept to
include animals:
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A notion of human dignity based on a separation of nature and man always entails the
condition of the possibility of repression of humans as well as nature. If we wish to
eliminate that possibility, we need a different concept of dignity, one that would not be “a
demarcation of differences” that “is directed against animals,” as Adorno […] criticizes
Kant’s concept of human dignity of being. True freedom cannot be based on unfreedom
for the other, instead the concept of dignity has to include what has been regarded as the
other of man: nature and the other animals.83
Although Adorno is certainly critical of Kant for ascribing dignity to human beings at the
expense and exclusion of other animals, Silberbusch’s and Flodin’s interpretations miss
something important about Adorno’s understanding of dignity. As we have seen, Adorno
questions whether anything can be said to possess dignity under capitalism. Therefore, it is
unlikely that he would prematurely ascribe dignity to animals, just as he would be hesitant to do
the same for humans. And to be sure, Adorno is not trying to ground animal dignity in the nonexchangeability of their names. Instead, he thinks the names of animals can express the
possibility of a dignity that has yet to be realized. By reflecting on such possibilities, individuals
are pointed in the direction of right life.
The claim that animals are disguised instantiations of utopia because they exist without
any recognizable purpose should not be misunderstood as Adorno romanticizing the lives of
animals. He does not wish to minimize the suffering that humans have inflicted on the animal
world. But if instances of things happening and existing for their own sake are disappearing from
the human world, then perhaps what is needed is to look to the world of animals for traces of the
possibility of something different. Chapter Three considers other possibilities that are made
available when we reflect on our relation to other animals. As we shall see, Adorno suggests that
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there are things we can learn from animals about living less wrongly, but Kant’s disdain for
animality effectively excludes the possibility of animals serving as any kind of model for ethical
behavior.
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CHAPTER THREE:
ANIMAL LIKENESS

In this chapter I examine Adorno’s concept of “animal likeness” (Tierähnlichkeit) and
discuss the role it plays in his philosophy. I begin by reconstructing Adorno’s account of the
relation between humans and animals. Insisting that we are not radically distinct from other
animals, Adorno argues that if we reflect on the natural history of our species and the evolution
of human reason, we will see that we are more like the other animals than we tend to admit. Far
from raising us “above” nature, reason has embroiled us even more deeply in the Darwinian
struggle for existence because historically we have used reason in the service of dominating
other organisms. Impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, we continue to blindly dominate
nature today, and with disastrous results. In order to prevent further destruction to the natural
world and its inhabitants, Adorno thinks that we need to come to the collective realization that
our survival instincts are careening out of control. Achieving an increased awareness of our own
instinctual nature might finally enable us to alter our behavior and change our destructive
relationship to animals and the natural world.
Next, I consider Adorno’s claim that humanity is deeply uncomfortable with its likeness
to animals. Adorno is especially critical of Kant’s philosophy for contributing to Western
culture’s disdain for animality. According to Adorno, it is our disdain for animality—and our
denial of animality in ourselves—that lies at the root of our domination of animals. As we shall
see, Adorno theorizes that certain forms of human domination are based on this denial as well.
Lastly, I discuss Adorno’s views on compassion and his critique of society’s coldness
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toward animal suffering. Unlike Kant, whose ethical system is marked by a distinct lack of
feeling, Adorno argues that compassion is indispensable to morality, and that having compassion
for suffering animals is essential for creating the kind of solidarity needed to end society’s
exploitation of them. Adorno thinks that we can foster solidarity by reflecting on our affinity
with animals. In connection with this idea, I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of
Adorno’s aesthetic theory and his belief in the power of art to awaken us from the denial of our
animal likeness.

I
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that Western thought has
been marked since its inception by an attempt to deny the resemblance between humans and
animals. Tracing the long history of Westerners defining themselves in opposition to animals,
they write:
Throughout European history the idea of the human being has been expressed in
contradistinction to the animal. The latter’s lack of reason is the proof of human dignity.
So insistently and unanimously has this antithesis been recited by all the earliest
precursors of bourgeois thought, the ancient Jews, the Stoics, and the Early Fathers, and
then through the Middle Ages to modern times, that few other ideas are so fundamental to
Western anthropology. The antithesis is acknowledged even today.84
Here Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that there is a kind of emptiness to the concept of human
dignity, that it has nothing more to stand on than the supposed absence of reason in other
animals. Although they never thoroughly discuss the cognitive capacities of other animals,
Adorno and Horkheimer consistently challenge the notion that reason radically distinguishes

84

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 203-204.
44

humans from other animals. Emphasizing the naturalness of reason, they contend that reason first
emerged as an “instrument of adaptation” to the environing world, and that it continued to
develop slowly over the course of the natural history of the human species as a means to the end
of self-preservation.85 Borrowing an illustration from Dialectic of Enlightenment, Cook observes
that “[r]eason can be compared to the teeth on a bear since both serve the same purpose; reason
just serves the purpose of adaptation more effectively.”86 Fooled by the power of their own
reason, humans have tricked themselves into believing that they are not animals. But in fact, as
Adorno and Horkheimer argue, reason has merely turned “humans into beasts with an ever-wider
reach.”87
Reason, then, may be said to distinguish humans from other animals in at least this one,
albeit negative, sense: it enables humans to dominate nature much more ruthlessly and
destructively than other animals. This is not to say, however, that human beings are necessarily
more rational (and therefore less instinctually driven) than other animals. On the contrary,
Adorno argues that humanity’s efforts to dominate nature throughout history have been driven
primarily by the instinct for self-preservation.
In contrast to Kant, who maintains a clean separation between reason and instinct,
Adorno stresses reason’s rootedness in nature and its entwinement with instinct. Not only was
reason born in response to survival imperatives, it continues to be driven, and perilously so, by
the instinct for self-preservation. The ferocity with which we continue to dominate nature today
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calls into question Kant’s assessment that reason has liberated us from the bondage of instinct.
While we have certainly surpassed the other animals in our ability to control the natural world,
this “victory” over nature is not what it seems. For as Cook observes, “our ceaseless attempts to
dominate nature reveal that we are as imprisoned in survival instincts as other animals.”88
Returning once again to the image of the rhinoceros, Adorno compares humanity’s efforts to
escape its instinctual nature to that of a rhinoceros trying in vain to shed the protective armor it
drags along like an “ingrown prison.”89 If the experience of being imprisoned in one’s own
survival mechanism helps to explain the “special ferocity of rhinoceroses,” Adorno suggests that
it may also explain the “unacknowledged and therefore more dreadful ferocity of homo
sapiens.”90
Paradoxically, the historical progression of instrumental reason has only led to more
unreason. This is evidenced by the irrational nature of the current environmental crisis. Our
efforts to preserve ourselves have become self-undermining and now threaten to destroy the
natural world on which our survival depends. The blindness with which we are marching toward
our own destruction makes a mockery of our self-proclaimed status as rational beings.
To be sure, when Adorno criticizes the destructive historical trajectory of human selfpreservation, he is not condemning the goal of self-preservation. In fact, he affirms that selfpreservation is a rational aim for living beings.91 For Adorno, the problem lies not with self-
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preservation as such but rather with the irrational pursuit of self-preservation.92 When the
instincts driving self-preservation begin to manifest destructively, self-preservation impedes
itself and becomes irrational.
According to Adorno, our predicament today is that we have let our survival instincts run
wild. As he observes in Negative Dialectics: “Even the steps which society takes to exterminate
itself are at the same time absurd acts of unleashed self-preservation.”93 Although human beings
will always depend on natural impulses for survival, Adorno thinks that we might be able to
channel those impulses in more rational and less destructive ways by reflecting on our own
instinctually-driven nature. In Problems of Moral Philosophy, he argues that when this kind of
self-reflection is permitted to take place, “the human subject is liberated from the blind pursuit of
natural ends and becomes capable of alternative actions.”94 On this point, Stone also observes:
[B]y acknowledging the dependency of our patterns of thinking and activity on our
natural impulses, we would be aware of those impulses at work in and on us. We could
then decide whether we wish to pursue these impulses or not, and if so in what ways.
That is, our awareness of the ongoing force of our inner nature would open up the space
in which we could exercise some freedom of choice with respect to that nature.95
If we wish to free ourselves from the compulsion of our internal nature, we cannot continue to
disavow our instincts or declare ourselves to be fully autonomous with respect to them. Instead,
we must strive to become more conscious of our natural impulses, for only then can we direct
Also at issue for Adorno is the “self” we are preserving. This self must be expanded to
embrace the species “upon which the survival of each individual literally depends” (“Marginalia
to Theory and Praxis,” 273).
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them toward more rational ends.
To summarize, Adorno underscores the irrational and always instinctual character of our
efforts to dominate nature in order to show that we have not distinguished ourselves from other
animals to the degree that we think we have. Confident that we have mastered nature, we fail to
recognize the ways that nature continues to exert control over us. As Cook observes, since the
domination of nature throughout history has been “impelled by nature itself in the form of the
instinct for self-preservation,” it has become increasingly clear that “the dominators of nature are
themselves dominated by nature.”96
Adorno argues that by continuing to dominate nature, human history merely repeats “the
unconscious history of nature, of devouring and being devoured.”97 Human history has yet to
distinguish itself from natural history because humanity remains largely unaware of the extent to
which its activity continues to be driven by survival instincts. So long as we persist in blindly
repaying domination with domination, nature will never relinquish its hold on us.
Although he is critical of how the line between humanity and nature has been drawn in
the past, Adorno considers the possibility that we might one day establish a non-hierarchical and
non-dominating basis on which to distinguish ourselves from nature. In his essay “Progress,”
Adorno declares that humanity does not yet exist, that the ideal of humanity has not yet been
realized, because so far in history our treatment of the natural world has been decidedly
inhuman. The only “progress” humankind has consistently made is progress in developing more
efficient ways to exploit nature, which is no progress at all. Consequently, Adorno argues that we
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cannot say genuine progress has occurred until “humanity becomes aware of its own inbred
nature and brings to a halt the domination it exacts upon nature.”98 What would truly distinguish
us from nature is if we used our capacity for self-reflection to finally bring our domination of
nature to an end.

II
Adorno speculates that the reason why human beings have yet to fully acknowledge their
instinctual nature is because they are reluctant to admit their likeness to animals. In History and
Freedom, he argues that human beings are in denial of their animality and that this denial is
rooted in narcissism:
[T]he suggestion that human beings are merely creatures of nature, and hence, in the last
analysis, automata, as Descartes’s animalia are supposed to be, is felt to be a major slight.
In general, humanity as a species feels an extraordinary revulsion from everything that
might remind it of its own animal nature, a revulsion which I strongly suspect to be
deeply related to the persistence of its very real animality. Probably one of the most
intractable problems of Kant’s conception of man and human nature lies in his attempt to
differentiate it, and together with it man’s dignity and everything that involves, and to
mark it off from animality. We can readily understand this [narcissistic] interest
historically if we picture to ourselves the indescribable efforts and the sacrifices that it
must have cost human beings in the course of their development to muster the strength to
master […] nature. For it was only thanks to these efforts and these sacrifices that it
became possible to distinguish themselves from nature and that this strength could be
reflected back to them as a divinely gifted quality, the quality of freedom.99
Here Adorno alludes to the theoretical difficulties that arise from Kant’s attempts to differentiate
humanity from animality. As we saw in Chapter One, Kant introduces a split between the rational
and animal natures of the human being. In The Metaphysics of Morals, he states that there are
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two standards by which the human being can value itself: either by a low standard in terms of its
animal nature, or by a high standard in terms of its rational nature. While Kant maintains that
these are both legitimate standards by which the human being can value itself, he goes on to
suggest that the human being should value itself only by the higher standard, arguing that “his
insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a
rational human being.”100
In the Groundwork, Kant takes a similar approach to separating the human being’s
rational nature from its animal nature. He argues that the human can view itself either as an
intelligible (rational) being belonging to the world of understanding, or as a sensible (animal)
being belonging to the world of sense. Kant insists that the human is only considered a free being
when its actions are viewed from the standpoint of the world of understanding, for it is only from
such a standpoint that reason can be considered the cause of its actions. When viewed from the
standpoint of the world of sense, however, the human being is merely an animal whose actions
are causally conditioned by nature in the form of instincts, impulses, and inclinations. Again,
while these are both legitimate standpoints from which the human being can view itself, Kant
argues that the human being’s rational nature takes precedence over its animal nature.
Consequently, the human being must regard itself as a member of the world of understanding
rather than the world of sense.
In Kant, the human being’s rational and animal natures are presented as mutually
exclusive. The human can only regard itself as a rational being at the exclusion of regarding itself
as an animal being, and vice versa. There is no third standpoint that unifies the two natures or
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allows them to coexist. Reason has no place in the world of sense, and instinct has no place in
the world of understanding.
To return to the passage from History and Freedom quoted above, Adorno casts suspicion
on Kant’s attempts to mark humanity off from animality. By dividing human nature in this way,
Kant is able to assert the independence of the human being’s rational nature over and against its
animal nature. Thus, Adorno concludes that Kant’s efforts are rooted in a narcissistic interest in
freedom—an interest, as it turns out, which is shared by humanity in general. Humanity seeks to
deny its resemblance to animals because of its own natural history. After all its efforts to get free
from nature, the last thing humanity wishes to remember is its animal past.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that something of the dread
humanity feels regarding its likeness to animals is expressed in children’s stories:
In popular fairy tales the metamorphosis of humans into animals is a recurring
punishment. To be imprisoned in an animal body is regarded as damnation. To children
and peoples, the idea of such transformations is immediately comprehensible and
familiar. Believers in the transmigration of souls in the earliest cultures saw the animal
form as punishment and torment. The mute wildness in the animal's gaze bears witness to
the horror which is feared by humans in such metamorphoses. Every animal recalls to
them an immense misfortune which took place in primeval times. Fairy tales express this
dim human intuition. But whereas the prince in the fairy tale retained his reason so that,
when the time came, he could tell of his woe and the fairy could release him, the animal's
lack of reason holds it eternally captive in its form, unless man, who is one with it
through his past, can find the redeeming formula and through it soften the stony heart of
infinity at the end of time.101
Importantly, the horror discerned in the animal gaze does not belong to the animal itself, but
instead is a projection by the human being who is horrified at the reminder of its own natural
origin. The animal’s unfreedom is falsely attributed to its lack of reason, when in fact the cold-
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heartedness of human society is at fault for the imprisonment of the animal. If the animal is to be
released from such bondage, humanity must “soften the stony heart” that hardens it to animal
suffering. This can only be accomplished through the recognition of humanity’s essential kinship
with other animals.
Adorno consistently underscores the delusional nature of believing that we have left our
animality behind us. Indeed, he argues that denying our animal nature reveals our animality all
the more, for in thinking that we are radically distinct from other animals, we betray our own
lack of self-reflection. Ironically, our narcissistic interest in having an exclusive claim to freedom
is preventing us from achieving the very freedom that would come with acknowledging
ourselves as animals. As Adorno’s analysis of self-preservation demonstrates, we will continue to
lash out destructively at the natural world so long as we remain blind to the natural impulses
driving our actions. Acknowledging our animality would serve to loosen the hold of survival
instincts on us and enable us to enjoy the freedom that is currently denied to us by our own
refusal to recognize ourselves as part of nature.
Adorno seeks to emphasize our likeness to animals in order to change the way that we
understand ourselves as human beings and to correct our faulty conception of animals and
animality in the process. Specifically, Adorno wishes to challenge the view, implied in Kantian
idealism but certainly not limited to that philosophy, that animals are subservient to their own
irresistible (and bestial) impulses.102 Kant scholar Allen W. Wood argues that Kant’s account of
animal behavior is highly dubious in this respect. “Apparently for Kant,” he writes, “the volition
For example, Adorno argues that modern biology projects beastliness onto animals “in order
to exonerate the people who abuse the animals.” As a result, “the ontology of beasts apes the […]
bestiality of men” (Negative Dialectics, 348).
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of animals is reduced to the immediate response to impulses, which lead to behaviors which are
either hardwired into the animal by instinct or follow conditioned patterns which result from
empirical associations arising out of such instincts.”103 This problematic conception of the animal
leads Kant to conceive animality as the antithesis of freedom. But unlike Kant, Adorno does not
equate animality with unfreedom, preferring instead to highlight the unfreedom that humans
impose on animals externally by subjugating them.
By criticizing the domination of animals, Adorno implicitly contests the notion that
animals are inherently unfree. Something which is already unfree cannot be dominated.
Moreover, it is important to remember what domination consists in for Adorno. Among other
things, it involves preventing a living being from developing spontaneously or from pursuing
spontaneously adopted ends. Against Kant, who denies animals the capacity to set ends for
themselves, Adorno would likely agree with Tom Regan, who points out that many animals have
“preference autonomy.” Preference autonomy is the ability to form preferences and to initiate
actions to satisfy them.104 Animals share with humans a capacity for spontaneous behavior, and
this is precisely what makes them vulnerable to domination. As we saw in Chapter One, Kant
maintains that only rational beings are able to act spontaneously, which leads him to locate the
human being in a realm beyond that of nature. Perhaps Kant would not have resorted to such
extreme measures to distance the human being from its animality if not for his insistence on the
unfreedom of the animal.
In the course of this chapter, I may have given the impression that by tracing the
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domination of nature back to the instinct for self-preservation, Adorno is condemning our
animality or disparagingly comparing our behavior to other animals. But this is not the case.
Although Adorno does portray nature in a somewhat Hobbesian light at times, Flodin rightly
notes that Adorno’s conception of nature is far more dialectical than some of his own statements,
taken by themselves, would seem to suggest.105 For Adorno, animal life is not merely an endless
cycle of eating and being eaten. Rather, this is the image that our nature-dominating society
“produces of nature and the world of the animal: as something static.”106 Consequently, Adorno
“does not regard the other animals as merely slaves to their own instincts.”107 Instead, he insists
that it is human beings who have become in thrall to survival instincts by denying their own
animality. As Flodin explains:
Human beings in denial of themselves as part of nature do not behave like other animals,
according to Adorno, but rather like the faulty conception of other animals characteristic
for our petrified society and identity thinking […]. When we deny our likeness to animals
and define ourselves as radically distinct from other animals, we become increasingly
like the false conception of animals that stems from this denial: instinctual creatures
trapped in ideological conditions.108
Thus, when Adorno says that Kant’s concept of human dignity implicitly “excludes man from
Adorno is sometimes accused of painting too bleak a picture of animal life. He argues, for
example, that because animals lack words and concepts, they are unable “[t]o escape the
gnawing emptiness of existence”; that is, they are doomed to live a merely natural existence
uninterrupted by “liberating thought” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 205). Unfortunately, this
passage has been misunderstood by commentators (see Carolin Duttlinger, “Traumatic
Metamorphoses: The Concept of the Animal in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialektik der
Aufklärung”: 48-53). Adorno deliberately exaggerates the plight of animals to encourage his
readers to be more empathetic toward them.
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nature, so that its humanity threatens incessantly to revert to the inhuman,”109 he is not equating
“inhumanity” with “animality.” Instead, inhumanity is the result of a distinctly human delusion
in which human beings narcissistically believe themselves to be above nature and therefore feel
entitled to dominate it with the same compulsive and bestial fervor they falsely attribute to other
animals.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Adorno claims that idealism is ultimately based on the
denigration of the animal—including the animal in the human. According to Adorno, “[n]othing
is more abhorrent to the Kantian than a reminder of man’s animal likeness.”110 This observation
leads him to make the following statement: “Animals play for the idealist system virtually the
same role as the Jews for fascism. To revile man as an animal—that is genuine idealism.”111
Jacques Derrida offers an illuminating gloss on Adorno’s remark about the similarity between
idealism and fascism in The Animal That Therefore I Am:
[F]ascism begins whenever one insults an animal, even the animal in man. Authentic
idealism consists in insulting the animal in the human or in treating the human as animal.
[…] [The idea of insult] doesn’t just imply verbal aggression, but an aggression that
consists in degrading, reviling, devaluing someone, contesting his or her dignity. One
doesn’t insult some thing but someone. Adorno doesn’t go so far as to say that the idealist
insults the animal, but that he insults […] man by calling him an animal, which implies
that ‘‘animal’’ is an insult.112
In idealism, as in fascism, the concept of humanity is based on the exclusion and devaluation of
the “Other.” Animals play the role of the Other for idealism, just as Jews play it for fascism. It is
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also worth noting that both idealists and fascists have a tendency to weaponize the human
being’s animal likeness in order to humiliate and degrade those whom they deem unfit to be
called human. As we shall see, even Kant cannot resist invoking the animal to shame the human
who falls short of the moral law.
For Kant, to be an animal is the worst thing a human being can be. We have already seen
him refer to the animality of the human being as insignificant, worthless, and crude (among other
things), but in The Metaphysics of Morals he goes a step further. In a remark directed toward
individuals who consume alcohol to “brutish” excess, he states that a “human being who is drunk
is like a mere animal, not to be treated as a human being.”113 He offers a similar remark in his
ethics lectures during a discussion of duties owed to “living beings that are not human”:
These [beings] are either […] beneath humanity by their nature, or by their animality.
Such beings are bruta (for in regard to morality no relationship can here be contemplated,
since they lack understanding). Towards bruta we have no immediate duty; among men,
indeed, no less than animals.114
These passages indicate that in Kant, no one is guaranteed the status of “human being.” Instead,
that status can be revoked, as in the case of drunks, or refused altogether, as in the case of
“bruta.” Once the human has been branded an animal, it is not to be treated as a human being,
and no moral relationship can be had with it. In other words, the human being is to be treated like
an animal as punishment for allegedly behaving like one.

III
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer highlight the dangerous
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consequences of negatively comparing humans to animals. What begins as an insult can swiftly
turn into a justification for genocide: “The distinctive human face, which humiliatingly recalls
our origin in nature and our enslavement to it, irresistibly invites expert homicide. The caricature
of the Jew has always relied on this.”115 For Adorno, the key to anti-Semitism and other forms of
racism is that by likening the oppressed to animals, the oppressor is able to justify subjugating
them just like animals have been subjugated. On this point, Cook observes:
[A]ll forms of oppression involve casting groups and individuals as Other than what the
oppressor is. And, in human history, nature has played the role of Other par excellence. It
is therefore not surprising that, when individuals and groups are marginalized within, or
excluded from, society, they are often portrayed as bestial or animal-like, inhuman or not
fully human, instinctive and irrational. In virtually all cases, the oppressor targets an
individual or group as merely natural. […] Once an individual or group is identified with
nature, there is no indignity that may not be visited upon it in order to subjugate it. Rape,
torture, segregation, confinement and enslavement are just some of the ways in which
“nature” has been brought to heel.116
Likening individuals and groups to animals would not be an effective means to justify their
oppression if animals themselves were not already mistreated in society. In this way, the
domination of animals is intimately linked to the domination of marginalized human beings.
Adorno illustrates this point in the following passage from Minima Moralia:
Indignation over cruelty diminishes in proportion as the victims are less like normal
readers, the more they are swarthy, “dirty,” dago-like. This throws as much light on the
crimes as on the spectators. Perhaps the social schematization of perception in antiSemites is such that they do not see Jews as human beings at all. The constantly
encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for
example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment
when the gaze of the fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being. The defiance with
which he repels this gaze—“after all, it’s only an animal”—reappears irresistibly in
cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having again and again to reassure
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themselves that it is “only an animal,” because they could never fully believe this even of
animals. In repressive society the concept of man is itself a parody of divine likeness. The
mechanism of “pathic projection” determines that those in power perceive as human only
their own reflected image, instead of reflecting back the human as precisely what is
different. Murder is thus the repeated attempt, by yet greater madness, to distort the
madness of such false perception into reason: what was not seen as human and yet is
human, is made a thing, so that its stirrings can no longer refute the manic gaze.117
Here Adorno suggests that what the perpetrators of violent hate crimes target when they commit
atrocities against racial minorities is their victims’ perceived animality. By “cleansing” the
human race of any trace of animality, the genocidal actors can remain secure in their own
delusional conception of humanity, which is based not on animal likeness but divine likeness.
For Adorno, the point is that genocide and other extreme forms of racial violence are rooted in a
denial of the animality of the human being. By projecting animal qualities onto their victims, the
aggressors betray their disgust of their own animality, which they desperately try to extirpate by
senselessly murdering those whom they accuse of being the “real animals.”
Adorno also suggests that the genocidal actors characterize their victims as animals
because they have already been conditioned to regard animal suffering with indifference. By
convincing themselves that their human victims are “only animals,” the murderers are able to
slay them without misgivings. The justification for destroying racial minorities is the same
justification for destroying animals: in both cases, the victims are regarded as mere “things” that
are so worthless and insignificant that their suffering hardly matters.
In light of the preceding observation, the passage from Minima Moralia quoted above
could be interpreted as an indirect critique of Kant. For like the perpetrator of genocide, Kant
also views animals as things. That being said, Adorno does seem to be in agreement with Kant
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on at least one point: the violent treatment of animals leads to the violent treatment of human
beings. In Chapter One, we saw that Kant considers animal cruelty to be immoral because it
desensitizes us to human suffering and makes us more likely to treat other human beings with
cruelty. While Adorno would accept Kant’s claim that withholding compassion from animals can
make us cold toward humans, he would likely point out that to view an animal as a thing is
already to show a lack of compassion for it. This is a source of great tension in Kantian animal
ethics. If our behavior toward animals can affect our behavior toward human beings, and we
have a duty to treat human beings as ends in themselves, how can we treat animals as mere
things without that leading us to treat human beings in the same way?
Ultimately, Kant has enormous difficulty determining where animals fit into his ethical
system and how they ought to be viewed and treated by human beings. According to Kant,
animals are things, instruments, and mere means, and yet at one point he believed that they were
analogous to human beings—an implicit acknowledgment of their human likeness. He also
concedes that unlike other “things,” animals are capable of suffering, which suggests that they
are not things at all. As we saw above, Adorno argues that those who commit atrocities against
other human beings must constantly reassure themselves that their victims are “only animals.”
This reassurance is needed, he says, because they could never fully believe even that animals are
“only animals.” Perhaps Kant, who must keep reminding his readers that animals are mere
things, unworthy of dignity or respect, never fully believed this either.

IV
Some commentators have argued that Adorno endorsed a compassion-based system of
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animal ethics inspired by Schopenhauer. Gerhardt, for example, points to the passage from
Problems of Moral Philosophy (discussed in Chapter One) where Adorno praises
Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy for its inclusion of animals and its emphasis on the importance
of extending compassion to animals. Commenting on this passage, Gerhardt writes: “In Adorno’s
eyes what has often been dismissed as mere crankiness [i.e. Schopenhauer’s advocacy of animal
protection] actually provides the grounds for a radically different relationship between humans
and animals that does not think of animals are mere things but rather as beings worthy of
compassion.”118
Following Gerhardt, Ryan Gunderson claims that Adorno was committed to a
Schopenhauerian ethics of compassion, and that he was indebted to Schopenhauer for calling
attention to the invisibility of animal suffering in society. Gunderson also notes that the concept
of Tierähnlichkeit figures prominently in Schopenhauer’s philosophy as well. “For
Schopenhauer,” Gunderson writes, “it was necessary for human beings to recognize their
essential similarity with animals and end the ‘tortures that are inflicted’ on animals by human
society.”119
While the similarities between Adorno’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophies are striking,
Gerhardt and Gunderson tend to overstate Schopenhauer’s influence on Adorno and largely
conflate it with Schopenhauer’s much more profound impact on Horkheimer. Furthermore, these
accounts fail to appreciate the complexity of Adorno’s engagement with the topic of compassion.

118

Gerhardt, “Thinking With”: 143.

Ryan Gunderson, “The First-Generation Frankfurt School on the Animal Question:
Foundations for a Normative Sociological Animal Studies,” Sociological Perspectives 57, no. 3
(2014): 293.
119

60

In Problems of Moral Philosophy, for example, Adorno criticizes the role that compassion plays
in Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy:
[T]he concept of compassion tacitly maintains and gives its sanction to the negative
condition of powerlessness in which the object of our pity finds himself. The idea of
compassion contains nothing about changing the circumstances that give rise to the need
for it, but instead, as in Schopenhauer, these circumstances are absorbed into the moral
doctrine and interpreted as its main foundation. In short, they are hypostasized and
treated as if they were immutable. We may conclude from this that the pity you express
for someone always contains an element of injustice towards that person; he experiences
not just our pity but also the impotence and the specious character of the compassionate
act.120
For Adorno, compassion that is divorced from the aim of changing the underlying conditions that
make compassion necessary merely mitigates suffering and therefore contributes to its
persistence. Such compassion does a disservice to the sufferers and unwittingly prevents their
suffering from being abolished.
Adorno also questions the extent to which individuals are capable of compassion under
capitalism. Indeed, he claims that compassion has been eroded by the social phenomenon of
“coldness.” As Simon Mussell explains, coldness refers to the “glacial atmosphere of
indifference” that characterizes atomized relations in late capitalism.121 Coldness and
indifference are built into the very structure of the economy because capitalism forces
individuals to compete against each other and rewards those who pursue their self-interests at the
expense of the interests of others. “In order to successfully survive and function amid such
conditions,” Mussell writes, “one must adopt or rather internalize this coldness and indifference:
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in other words, it has become socially necessary to remain as indifferent as possible.”122 Adorno
maintains that no one is immune from coldness since “without such coldness one could not
live.”123
Following Adorno, Mussell points out that the effects of coldness extend beyond the
immediate context of exchange relations. For at its core, coldness involves a profound “lack of
empathy and corporeal connection with living things”124 Consequently, coldness functions as a
precondition for extreme acts of violence against humans and other animals. According to
Adorno, the coldness that enables one to repel the gaze of a dying animal is the same coldness
that makes pogroms possible. And indeed, pogroms are possible not only because the
perpetrators have deadened their feeling for the suffering of the other but because the spectators
are equally cold in their indifference to such atrocities.
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that coldness begins in childhood, and that
children first learn coldness in relation to animals. To illustrate this point, he recounts what may
well be a memory from his own childhood:
A child, fond of an innkeeper named Adam, watched him club the rats pouring out of
holes in the courtyard; it was in his image that the child made its own image of the first
man. That this has been forgotten, that we no longer know what we used to feel before
the dogcatcher’s van, is both the triumph of culture and its failure.125
Adorno claims that when children are confronted with animal suffering, an unconscious

122

Mussell, “‘Pervaded by a Chill’”: 58.

123 Adorno,
124

“Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” 274.

Mussell, “’Pervaded by a Chill’”: 58.

125 Adorno,

Negative Dialectics, 366.
62

knowledge whispers to them: “this is what matters.”126 This knowledge, however, is eventually
repressed by “civilized education.”127 Babette Babich illustrates this point vividly:
Conscious of what it is being taught at every moment, the child learns passivity,
helplessness, acceptance, complicity in the face of the subjugation of nature […]. Thus
the farmer’s child learns to drown excess kittens and puppies without a word, the city
child learns to walk away from beggars on the street, learns that pigeons are dirty, that
strays are to be ignored or left behind. Thus we learn to look away from suffering; we are
taught that such things do not count.128
Children who are fortunate enough to make it through such education with their sensitivity to
animal suffering relatively intact are later shamed for it in adulthood. Indeed, Adorno and
Horkheimer argue that in modern societies, “to show concern for animals is considered […] a
betrayal of progress.”129 Likewise, individuals who go out of their way to treat animals with
kindness and respect may be seen as having abandoned rationality. To reject coldness, then, is
not only to risk undermining one’s survival prospects in an economy that promotes the singleminded pursuit of self-interest, it is also to risk being socially ostracized. As Adorno observes:
“Anyone who is not cold, who does not chill himself […], must feel condemned.”130
In sum, while Adorno acknowledges that compassion for animals is sorely lacking in
society, he also recognizes that there are serious impediments to the kind of transformative,
compassionate action needed to bring about an improved state of affairs. Coldness has become
inescapable under capitalism, such that the “ability of anyone, without exception, to identify with
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another’s suffering is slight.”131 Adorno observes that in the face of the seeming
insurmountability of coldness, “the individual is left with no more than the morality for which
Kantian ethics—which accords affection, not respect, to animals—can muster only disdain: to try
to live so that one may believe himself to have been a good animal.”132 To understand what
Adorno means by this, we will need to examine the elements of coldness in Kant’s ethical
system.
In Chapter One, we saw that Kant disapproves of moral actions that arise out of instincts,
impulses, and inclinations. In fact, he considers these motives to be utterly devoid of moral
worth. The only actions that have moral worth, in Kant’s eyes, are those performed from the
motive of duty, because only those actions are determined by reason alone. This is why in the
Groundwork Kant praises the cold philanthropist who fulfills his duties to others despite his
indifference to their suffering. According to Kant, such a person has a character of the highest
moral worth because his actions spring from duty rather than inclination.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that feelings of compassion and
sympathy are among the inclinations that taint the purity of one’s disposition to duty. Such
feelings are burdensome to rational individuals because they threaten the clarity of one’s moral
reasoning. Consequently, in order to achieve moral perfection, one must strive as much as
possible to act independently of compassionate feelings.
As these examples demonstrate, the status of compassion in Kantian ethics is somewhat
ambiguous. On the one hand, Kant argues that feelings of compassion are unreliable guides to
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morality because they can affect our ability to reason clearly about moral issues. On the other
hand, he also claims that our capacity to empathize with the suffering of others can be morally
useful and that we should not try to damage this capacity intentionally. Ultimately, though, by
holding up the unfeeling philanthropist as the exemplar of moral perfection, Kant sides against
compassion in favor of the kind of cold rationality that acts from duty alone. Not only is
compassion unnecessary for moral action, it can actively hinder us from doing the right thing.
What is more, actions based on compassion have no moral worth, and when we allow
compassionate impulses to take precedence over rational considerations of duty, we fail to act
with pure intentions and thwart the cultivation of our disposition to duty.
Some Kantians have argued that Kantian moral philosophy is not as opposed to
compassion as it seems. Barbara Herman, for example, contends that Kantian moral philosophy
does not require us to become cold and unfeeling toward others in order for our actions to have
moral worth.133 She argues that while Kant does seem to imply in the philanthropist example that
a dutiful action cannot have moral worth if it is accompanied by feelings of compassion, the
traditional interpretation of this example draws the wrong conclusion from it. According to
Herman, Kant is not suggesting that it is morally preferable to act without inclination; rather, his
point is to show that we should act from the motive of duty regardless of whether there is a
supporting inclination involved. So long as duty is ultimately the motive on which the subject
acts, the presence of a nonmoral motive does not detract from the moral worth of the action. For
Herman, this means that the Kantian subject is not barred from having a compassionate interest
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in performing a dutiful action so long as that interest does not take priority over the subject’s
interest in duty.
For the most part, Herman’s interpretation is plausible. However, it still does little to
mitigate the coldness inherent in Kantian moral philosophy. While on Herman’s reading the
Kantian subject is not required to extinguish its feelings of compassion, it is obliged to suppress
the urge to act on them, and this is precisely what makes Kantian moral philosophy cold. The
Kantian subject is initially unmoved in the face of misery. Instead of rushing to the aid of those
in need, the Kantian subject is required to hold back and deliberate over the moral law before
acting. Herman’s interpretation of the philanthropist example does not change the fact that in
Kant, only actions that proceed from rational considerations of duty have moral worth.
This brings us to Adorno’s critique of Kant. According to Adorno, Kantian moral
philosophy promotes the same bodily detachment from the suffering of others that characterizes
coldness under capitalism. Since the Kantian subject is expected to refrain from acting on its
compassionate impulses, it cannot truly identify with or respond appropriately to others’
suffering. As we have seen, Kant implicitly associates compassion with animality when he refers
to the former as an “instinct” and a “natural” capacity. This suggests that his contempt for
compassion is ultimately rooted in his contempt for animality. In Adorno’s view, however,
animality is precisely what is needed to combat coldness. To live as a good animal is to break the
icy grip of exchange relations and reestablish a physical bond with other living beings. Unlike
Kant, Adorno does not invoke the animal in the context of morality to insult or shame the human.
Instead, he offers the idea of living as a good animal as a corrective to Kantian ethics. Aspiring to
be a good animal would be more human than trying to live like the Kantian “person” that denies
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and suppresses its animality.
In Chapter Two, I argued that one of the aims of Adorno’s philosophy (especially in
works such as Minima Moralia) is to locate and rescue possibilities for right living that have not
yet been lost to exchange relations. This is no easy task, for as Adorno argues, exchange relations
have affected nearly every aspect of human life. Consequently, Adorno’s search often uncovers
possibilities for right living that moral philosophers have traditionally neglected or overlooked.
For instance, we saw previously that Adorno offers the image of the child at play as one such
model of right living.
Here I argue that Adorno is doing something similar when he speaks of the “good
animal.” Gerhardt takes a similar reading, arguing that for Adorno, “the very animal that Kantian
ethics regards with such disdain should not be the source of derision but instead the guide to
morality.”134 Like children, animals have rarely in the history of Western philosophy been
regarded as the ones from whom we ought to take our moral cues. But as we shall see, Adorno
establishes a link between morality and animality when he argues that instinct is a constitutive
element of moral action. In contrast to Kant, who regards animality as the antithesis of morality,
Adorno argues that human beings are capable of morality not in spite of their animality but
precisely because of it.
At various points throughout his work, Adorno emphasizes the instinctual character of
morality, arguing against Kant that physical impulses are inseparable from moral action. In his
lectures on metaphysics, for example, Adorno claims that “the true basis of morality is to be
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found in bodily feeling, in identification with unbearable pain.”135 In Negative Dialectics, he
describes this bodily feeling as an impulse, one that involves a sense of solidarity with
“tormentable bodies,” and argues that such impulses are “immanent in moral conduct.”136 As a
visceral, corporeal response to physical suffering, the “moral impulse” is not reducible to reason,
yet it contains a normative element that is essential to morality. According to Adorno, this
impulse “tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different.”137
Fabian Freyenhagen argues that Adorno’s notion of living as a good animal involves all
the elements outlined above: namely, identifying with the suffering of others and showing
solidarity with tormentable bodies.138 In addition, he argues that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
concept of “natural compassion” captures well what Adorno means when he suggests that a turn
toward animality is needed to fight coldness:
For Rousseau, compassion consists in the “innate repugnance of seeing a fellow-creature
suffer.” Put differently, it is an instinctive reaction that takes the form of recognizing
one’s own struggle for self-preservation in the suffering of others. Animals experience
compassion as much as humans do (in fact, it seems to be in virtue of being animals that
humans are capable of compassion). Showing compassion might thus be part of what
makes a “good animal.”139
Freyenhagen notes that for Rousseau (and for Adorno as well), natural compassion “involves
identification with the suffering of another creature to the extent of reacting with the same
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immediacy and spontaneity to its suffering as to one’s own suffering.”140 And Freyenhagen
argues that, like Rousseau, Adorno also recognizes this capacity in other animals:
The solidarity with tormentable bodies arises out of the abhorrence of (physical)
suffering, which has direct motivational force for human animals. Insofar as Adorno
situates this practical abhorrence within natural evolution, he would accept that other
animals are capable of it and that it is a natural reaction, a “physical impulse.”141
While Freyenhagen does not supply any evidence to support the claim that animals react
instinctively to the suffering of other creatures, empathy in nonhuman animals is a wellestablished phenomenon. Many animals become distressed when they witness members of the
same species in distress and will act to terminate that distress even at the risk of endangering
their own safety.142 Under the right conditions, some animals will even respond empathetically to
the distress of humans as well as other animals that do not belong to their own species.143
By invoking the image of the “good animal,” Adorno demonstrates a respect for animals
that Kant lacks. The animal is a symbol of immorality in Kant, which is why he compares
humans who disobey the moral law to animals. When the human behaves badly, it is the animal
within that gets blamed. Adorno, however, does not share Kant’s view of animality. Instead, he
insists that the impulse against physical suffering (an impulses that arises from our animal being)
has moral worth and should not be excluded from ethics.
In his History and Freedom lectures, Adorno recounts an apocryphal story about
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Friedrich Nietzsche, who is said to have intervened against a coachman mistreating a horse
because he simply could not “stand by and watch any longer.”144 Adorno observes that “where
this kind of reaction is completely absent, […] there can be no room for ideas of freedom and
humanity.”145 He adds: “Perhaps the gravest objection to Kantian moral theory is that it has no
room for motives of this kind.”146
To be sure, when Adorno says that we should try to live as good animals, he is not
suggesting that we forgo reason and self-reflection in ethical matters—far from it. As we have
already seen, Adorno believes that self-reflection is essential for ending humanity’s domination
of nature. In fact, what enables us to live as good human animals is that we can reflect on
ourselves and our motivations. For instance, by reflecting on the fact that we feel free to kill
other animals because we believe we are superior to them, we can question the basis for our
alleged superiority and then change our behavior accordingly.147 On the whole, Adorno thinks
there should be more of this kind of reflection in the world, not less.
That being said, Adorno also recognizes that reflection and rational deliberation can
sabotage action in situations where an immediate response is necessary to prevent or end
suffering. He illustrates this point in the following example from his lectures on moral
philosophy:
[C]onsider the moment when a refugee comes to your door and asks for shelter. What
would be the consequence if you were to set the entire machinery of reflection in motion,
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instead of simply acting and telling yourself that here is a refugee who is about to be
killed or handed over to some state police in some country or other, and that your duty
therefore is to hide and protect him—and that every other consideration must be
subordinated to this? If reason makes its entrance at this point then reason itself becomes
irrational.148
Unlike Kant, who insists unconditionally on the subordination of impulse to reason, Adorno
suggests that sometimes it is more rational to not engage in rational deliberation before acting.
Indeed, it would be immoral in Adorno’s view to withdraw into a state of self-reflection in a
situation that urgently calls for one to respond without hesitation to the suffering (or imminent
suffering) of others.
To return to the discussion that opened this section, Adorno’s position on compassion is
more ambivalent than some commentators have made it seem. While he agrees with
Schopenhauer that compassion is the right response to the suffering of human and nonhuman
animals, he goes further than Schopenhauer by insisting that compassion is not enough, that
domination must end. Additionally, Adorno recognizes that under the frigid conditions of late
capitalism, individuals are not only discouraged from acting compassionately but are also
required to internalize coldness in order to survive. Consequently, the capacity of individuals to
empathize with others is severely diminished.
If coldness is to be resisted, we must return to the “basis of morality,” that primal, bodily
feeling that coldness has not yet fully extinguished. As an essential part of our animal nature, the
impulse against suffering preserves the possibility of a transformed relationship between
ourselves and other animals. By responding to animal suffering in the same way that many
animals respond to each other’s suffering, we affirm our animality while simultaneously
148 Adorno,
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recognizing other animals as beings who also have tormentable bodies and who are therefore
equally deserving of compassion. For Adorno, reflecting on such impulses and being responsive
to them is essential for overcoming the delusion of the absolute difference between ourselves and
other animals.

V
To conclude this chapter, I would like to summarize Adorno’s main claims regarding
society’s troubling relationship with animals and animality before turning briefly to several
passages from Adorno’s writings on aesthetics and art that make use of the concept of
Tierähnlichkeit.
According to Adorno, the systematic domination of animals in society is predicated on
the belief that human beings are not creatures of nature like other animals but are somehow
outside of nature or separate from it and are therefore authorized to treat nature and the other
animals however they wish. While Adorno thinks that we have a vested interest in this belief
because it allows us to freely exploit other animals, he also suspects that there is a narcissistic
interest underlying the denial of our animality. Not wanting to believe that our efforts since
prehistory to free ourselves from nature have been in vain, we have convinced ourselves that we
possess a special quality of freedom that no other natural being enjoys.
However, Adorno argues that we have not successfully freed ourselves from nature
because our endless pursuit to dominate nature has itself been driven by the natural instinct for
self-preservation. Indeed, we have become increasingly in thrall to this instinct precisely because
we refuse to acknowledge it in ourselves. By disavowing our instinctual nature, we have blinded
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ourselves to the self-destructive course that our survival instincts have taken. Unless this course
changes soon, we will destroy the natural world along with ourselves.
Adorno outlines an additional consequence of viewing ourselves as radically distinct
from other animals. Historically, the revulsion human beings feel toward their animality has
manifested in the projection of that animality onto others. Arguing that this kind of projection is
essential to anti-Semitism and other forms of racism, Adorno observes that those in power often
portray marginalized groups as animals in order to justify using violence and other means to
oppress them. He also points out that people are far less likely to express indignation over racist
violence if the victims are cast as animal-like. This is because they have already learned from an
early age to be indifferent to cruelties done to animals.
Ultimately, Adorno believes that our failure to reconcile ourselves with our animality has
brought immeasurable harm to ourselves and other animals and that it now threatens to
jeopardize all life on earth. Our situation calls for us to bring our domination of nature to an end,
a feat that would require us to come to terms with our animality. Adorno suggests that we can
start this process by reflecting on our animal likeness. One of the ways that we can engage in
such reflection is by acknowledging the extent to which survival instincts have shaped our
thought and behavior.
In addition, Adorno suggests that we can foster a deeper appreciation of our animal
likeness by reflecting on aesthetic representations of Tierähnlichkeit. In connection with this
idea, Adorno references the works of Gustav Mahler and Franz Kafka. In Mahler: A Musical
Physiognomy, Adorno writes about the third movement of Mahler’s Third Symphony, entitled
“What the Animals in the Forest Tell Me”:
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Through animals humanity becomes aware of itself as impeded nature and of its activity
as deluded natural history; for this reason Mahler meditates on them. For him, as in
Kafka’s fables, the animal realm is the human world as it would appear from the
standpoint of redemption, which natural history itself precludes. The fairy-tale tone in
Mahler is awakened by the resemblance of animal and man. Desolate and comforting at
once, nature grown aware of itself casts off the superstition of the absolute difference
between them.149
In Prisms, Adorno compares the redemptive quality of Mahler’s music to Kafka’s stories, noting
that both artists use the theme of animals to remind human beings of their own animality.
“Instead of human dignity, the supreme bourgeois concept,” Adorno writes, “there emerges in
[Kafka] the salutary recollection of the similarity between man and animal, an idea upon which a
whole group of his narratives thrives.”150 Here Adorno contrasts the concept of human dignity
with Tierähnlichkeit; the latter is meant to serve as a corrective to the former.
Remarking again on the connection between children and animals, Adorno suggests that
the possibility of recapturing a childlike and intuitive awareness of our animal likeness becomes
available through art:
In its clownishness, art consolingly recollects prehistory in the primordial world of
animals. Apes in the zoo together perform what resembles clown routines. The collusion
of children with clowns is a collusion with art, which adults drive out of them just as they
drive out their collusion with animals. Human beings have not succeeded in so
thoroughly repressing their likeness to animals that they are unable in an instant to
recapture it and be flooded with joy; the language of little children and animals seems to
be the same. In the similarity of clowns to animals the likeness of humans to apes flashes
up; the constellation animal/fool/clown is a fundamental layer of art.151
Here Adorno strikes a hopeful note. Although our likeness to animals has been repressed, it is
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never far from the surface. And when we choose to acknowledge that likeness, instead of
denying it or using it to insult other human beings, the recognition of our similarity to animals
can become a source of pure joy. It is with this promise in mind that Adorno encourages us to not
just accept our animal likeness but to embrace it.
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CONCLUSION

My aim in this thesis has been to highlight the importance of animals to Adorno’s
thought. As a critical theorist concerned with the project of human liberation, Adorno recognized
that human oppression and animal oppression are inextricably linked, and consequently, that the
liberation of humans depends on the simultaneous liberation of animals. Adorno was committed
to including animals in the emancipatory project of critical theory because he believed that
society’s treatment of animals constituted domination. By tracing domination across species
lines, Adorno sought to give voice to animal suffering and to expose oppressions shared by both
human and nonhuman animals. For Adorno, the entwinement of human domination and animal
domination meant that neither form of domination could be adequately theorized or critiqued in
isolation.
The theme of animals in Adorno deserves more scholarly attention than it has
traditionally received. Scholars interested in the Adorno-Kant connection may find this theme
especially worth investigating, given that Adorno reserved his most biting commentary on Kant
for the latter’s view of animals and animality. Additionally, those interested specifically in
Kantian animal ethics may find Adorno’s analysis equally illuminating. While there has been no
shortage of criticism leveled at Kant from animal ethicists in the last several decades, Adorno
stands out as a distinctive voice among these critics. Adorno’s critique of Kant is unique because
it traces the problems that arise from Kantian animal ethics back to Kant’s contempt for the
animality of the human being, as well as his implicit rejection of the similarity between humans
and other animals. For Adorno, a truly humane animal ethics is not possible in the absence of the
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recognition that humans and animals are fundamentally alike.
Adorno believed that questions concerning our ethical relationship to animals were
central to philosophy. In Towards a New Manifesto, he declares that “[p]hilosophy exists in order
to redeem what you see in the look of an animal.”152 Adorno was sensitive to that fact that all too
often it is the look of suffering animals that we encounter, from the gaze of the fatally-wounded
animal to the zoo animal trapped on the other side of the glass. As he observes in Aesthetic
Theory: “There is nothing so expressive as the eyes of animals—especially apes—which seem to
objectively mourn that they are not human.”153
Expressed through the eyes of the animal that finds itself at the mercy of the human is the
yearning for a changed relationship between humans and animals. If philosophy exists in order to
redeem what lies in the animal gaze, it is because that gaze challenges us to live up to our
humanity. As Robert Savage rightly notes, Adorno was firm in his conviction that “the path to
humanity leads toward animality, not away from it.”154 For Adorno, a fully-realized humanity
would consist in nothing less than the reconcilement of human beings to their animality and the
establishment of their right relation to other animals.
It is my hope that the subjects treated in this thesis have provoked thought about
contemporary issues. Indeed, Adorno’s insights are more relevant than ever given the current
environmental crisis. Scientists warn that we are in the midst of a sixth mass extinction,
estimating that up to 50% of all animal and plant species on earth could become extinct by the
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end of the 21st century if we do not drastically alter our destructive course. Although concerns
about climate change and mass extinction were just beginning to emerge at the time of Adorno’s
passing in 1969, he was remarkably prescient in his analysis of the dangerous trajectory of our
exploitation of the natural world. In light of the problems facing us today, Adorno’s animal
philosophy offers useful resources for thinking about the underlying causes of the environmental
crisis and for theorizing alternatives to our destructive and self-destructive relationship to nature
and the other animals.
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